Alternative vs Traditional Corporate Governance Systems in Italy: An Empirical Analysis by Bellavite Pellegrini, Carlo et al.
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Alternative vs Traditional Corporate
Governance Systems in Italy: An
Empirical Analysis
Bellavite Pellegrini, Carlo and Pellegrini, Laura and Sironi,
Emiliano
Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milano, University of
Messina
2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/104656/
MPRA Paper No. 104656, posted 14 Dec 2020 10:18 UTC
Problems and Perspectives in Management, Volume 8, Issue 3, 2010
4
SECTION 1. Macroeconomic processes and regional economies 
management
Carlo Bellavite Pellegrini (Italy), Laura Pellegrini (Italy), Emiliano Sironi (Italy)
Alternative vs. traditional corporate governance systems in Italy:
an empirical analysis 
Abstract 
The 2003 Italian Corporate Law Reform, establishing one-tier vs. two-tier board for listed and unlisted joint stock companies, 
introduced alternative corporate governance systems. This study implements probit regressions in order to compare 548 
unlisted firms: corporations with best performances in sales and capital structure, as well as those under “control and coordi-
nation”, maintain a traditional system. Conversely, firms with a high proportion of individual shareholders adopt alternative 
systems. For alternative system firms, split between one-tier and two-tier boards, companies under “control and coordination” 
action tend to implement a one-tier system, same as firms with a higher proportion of individual shareholders.  
Keywords: corporate governance, one-tier board, two-tier board. 
JEL Classification: G34, K22, M42. 
Introduction
The recent history of European corporate law has 
been affected by relevant changes, in particular on 
corporate governance branch, which affect both na-
tional and European institutions and companies. This 
paper is based on the Italian 2003 Reform of corpo-
rate governance which allowed companies to choose 
among three different models. Besides the traditional 
model of corporate governance, based on a board of 
directors and an external audit committee, two alter-
native Corporate Governance Systems (CGSs from 
now onward) have been introduced: the one-tier 
model, based on the Anglo-American tradition, and 
the two-tier model, derived from the German tradi-
tion. The two “alternative” CGSs generated by the 
2003 Reform show different peculiarities in the 
method of appointment of managing and controlling 
bodies and are considered of interest in the current 
global financial and economic crisis, because of their 
adoption by some of the most important banks and 
financial institutions in Italy (e.g., Intesa-San Paolo, 
Banca Popolare Italiana, Banca Popolare di Verona, 
Unione delle Banche Italiane). 
Generally speaking, alternative CGSs seem to attract 
both listed and unlisted joint stock companies in Italy. 
The aim of this paper is to compare traditional vs. 
alternative CGSs in unlisted joint stock companies; 
specifically, we focus on unlisted joint stock compa-
nies adopting alternative CGSs in opposition to those 
maintaining a traditional model. Also, we wish to 1) 
verify whether firms who have adopted one of these 
innovative alternative models of corporate governance 
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may be identified in terms of size, economic and fi-
nancial indices and ownership structure; 2) ascertain if 
some characteristics might drive firms to adopt a dif-
ferent model of corporate governance compared to the 
traditional one. 
Therefore, we implement a binary response regres-
sion in order to discover the determinants of the 
choice of an alternative system instead of a tradi-
tional one. Secondly, we split the different alterna-
tive systems, distinguishing the determinants of one 
tier or two tier model.  
The paper is organized as follows: the first Section, 
outlining the literature on CGSs, follows this short 
introduction, giving also more details about the struc-
ture of the corporate governance systems analyzed. In 
the second Section, after the sample description, we 
illustrate key economic and financial features of com-
panies with both alternative and traditional CGSs in 
the Italian context. The third Section describes the 
statistical methodology and the fourth one presents the 
empirical results. Comments on results and conclu-
sions are in the final Section. 
1. Alternative vs. traditional corporate governance 
systems 
Corporate governance can be viewed as the process 
by which investors attempt to minimize the transac-
tions costs (Coase, 1937) and agency costs (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976) associated with company fi-
nancial and ownership structure (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1995, 1997). Early academic debate about 
corporate governance in the United States focused 
on this issue as mechanisms for controlling agency 
costs (Manne, 1965). More recently there has been 
renewed attention to the legal responsibilities of 
corporate boards of directors, about the efficacy of 
shareholder legal action as a mechanism for control-
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ling agency costs, and, possibly, about the role of 
institutional investors as corporate monitors (Enri-
ques and Volpino, 2007). It seems to come out the 
incompleteness of corporate contracts and the essen-
tial role of corporate governance principles to fill the 
gaps in these incomplete, contingent contracts and the 
relevance of a control managerial shrinking, to control 
agency costs. From this point of view, corporate law 
seems to provide a set of standard terms that allow for 
minimizing contracting costs.  
The possibility of adopting an alternative corporate 
governance system (i.e. one-tier and two-tier boards) 
instead of the traditional one was introduced in Italy by 
the Corporate Law Reform at the beginning of 2004. 
This reform, which allows for the adoption of a one- or 
a two-tier board for both listed and unlisted joint stock 
companies, has modified the traditional model of cor-
porate governance, that is characterized by three dif-
ferent corporate bodies which govern firms: the share-
holders’ meeting1 with substantial decisional powers, 
the board of directors2  entrusted with particular 
managerial functions  and the board of auditors3 that 
monitors the organization and, in specific case, has 
further monitoring functions on management of the 
company4.
The introduction of two-alternative (one-tier and two-
tier models) corporate governance systems in a single 
legal system, and the freedom to choose among them 
and the traditional system represents an innovative 
approach to the problem of corporate governance and 
must be considered in the light of academic literature 
on global convergence of corporate law (Bebchuck 
and Roe, 1999; Coffee, 1999 – see also Hopt and 
Leyens, 2004).  
The one-tier model derives from the Anglo-American 
tradition and looks like to be simpler and more flexible 
model than the other ones. In this system the share-
holders’ meeting appoints the board of directors that 
appoints some of its members – with peculiarity of 
“independence5”  to an audit committee delegated 
with monitoring functions. We remark that these 
monitoring functions involve an internal auditing con-
trol on truthfulness and fairness of management. Simi-
larly to both the traditional and the two-tier models, we 
observe the presence of an external auditor who checks 
compliance with accounting procedures. The most 
                                                     
1 Assemblea degli azionisti. 
2 Consiglio di amministrazione. 
3 Collegio sindacale. 
4 The monitoring function on management is provided just for listed 
companies. Then, this type of function is not provided for unlisted 
companies who compose our sample. 
5 By “peculiarity of independence” we mean members of the board of 
directors without relationship to other directors or shareholder of the 
firms, without other important professional tasks for the firm or the 
definition of shareholder in the same firm. 
important feature of this CGS system is the unification 
of the monitoring and the managing bodies of the firm. 
Examining the tasks granted to each corporate body, 
we remark that the functions of the shareholders’ 
meeting and the functions of the board of directors are 
partially overlapping to the functions already seen for 
the same bodies in the traditional model. The main 
difference between the traditional system and the one-
tier model is then the weaker monitoring powers of the 
management audit committee compared to the powers 
of the board of auditors in the traditional ones. Accord-
ing to the above definition, this model is likely to lead 
to a better distribution of information between the 
managing and controlling bodies, allowing improve-
ments in transparency, with remarkable reductions in 
terms of costs and time. 
In contrast, the two-tier model could be defined as the 
most multi-faceted one. This model owes its basic 
structure to the German tradition6, where the share-
holders’ meeting7 appoints a supervisory board8
characterized both by monitoring functions on manag-
ing body of the firms and empowered by the imple-
mentation of the corporate strategy definition  which 
then appoints a management board9 whose main func-
tion is to manage the company.  
This model dates back to the end of XIX century (or 
the beginning of XX century) and draws its basic char-
acteristics from the social-democratic culture that 
emerged in central Europe, during the Austro-
Hungarian empire. The two-tier model became firmly 
established after last time of WW2 when new issues, 
like “economic democracy” and “employees represen-
tation in management” inside companies, started to 
emerge. This change of perspective took place largely 
in Germany, where the supervisory board was com-
posed by some union officers10 with monitoring and 
inspection functions on management’ actions and be-
havior (Wirth, 2004). 
The alternative CGSs and the traditional ones differ 
significantly in some aspects. In fact, although some 
functions of corporate bodies appear similar in both 
two-tier and traditional models, there are also specific 
functions which are different. In particular, beginning 
with the functions defined for the shareholders’ meet-
ing in the traditional model, the supervisory board has 
two powers: a) to approve the balance sheet, and b) to 
take legal action against members of the management 
board without dissolving the shareholders’ meeting. In 
this model, the separation between ownership and 
                                                     
6 But also France, Netherlands, and Portugal. 
7 Hauptversammlung (assemblea degli azionisti). 
8 Aufsichtsrat (consiglio di sorveglianza). 
9 Vorstand (consiglio di gestione). 
10 Who compose and represent the labor union too. 
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control is then remarkable, because the members of the 
management body1 are not directly appointed by the 
shareholders’ meeting but their appointment is a su-
pervisory board duty. Finally, the two-tier model pro-
vides an important role for the supervisory board, with 
new controlling functions and the power to perform 
duties entrusted to the board of directors or to the 
shareholders’ meeting in the traditional model. 
2. The transition towards alternative models 
In recent years, there has been an increased interest in 
topics related to corporate governance systems, overall 
in the highlight of Company Law’s Reform (2003), 
but without finding out which corporate governance 
system could be the best. This lack could be due to the 
presence of no generally accepted criteria for the ap-
propriate means to measure alternative systems of 
corporate governance.  
Generally speaking, it’s possible to identify three ways 
to measure empirically the performance of CGSs. At 
first, according to Shleifer and Vishny (1994, 1995) 
and relevant work of Zingales (1994), it is possible to 
categorize the performance of corporate governance 
systems on the basis of the capacity to hold up man-
ager’s ability to divert firm resources to their own 
private benefits. The second empirical measure is re-
lated to the compliance of entrepreneurs to make IPO2
and finally, a third measure of the performance could 
be identified in the functioning of internal and external 
markets for corporate control. 
In the consideration here above mentioned, try to iden-
tify which CGS is the best one isn’t an easy issue. 
Moreover, the incompleteness of the regulation of the 
one-tier and two-tier models3 combined with the un-
certainty about the final shape of these systems in the 
Italian legal system, define a more complex frame-
work (Ghezzi and Malberti, 2008). 
This study tries to highlight the features and the identifi-
cation of the determinants of the adoption of alternative 
corporate governance systems in the Italian context. 
Bellavite Pellegrini (2006 and 2009) described sum-
mary statistics reporting Italian joint stock companies 
that adopted alternative CGSs.  
Before analyzing the data, we mention some issues. 
Firstly, we underline the problems related to the path 
dependence of Italian firms under the traditional 
model, which is still the most influential and most 
commonly used in Italy and has been continued by the 
Italian legislator; secondly, many firms might have 
                                                     
1 Management board. 
2 I.e. investors who are confident that a particular system of CGs adequately 
protects them from inappropriate manager’ actions will be more inclined to 
make investment. Moreover, firms operate with an appropriate and functioning 
CGS will be able to sell their shares to the public, otherwise, will not. 
3 In fact the Italian Legislature has not yet completed all the necessary 
adjustments.  
stopped from adopting an alternative models in order 
to understand the final shape of the provisions of these 
new CGSs. Another problem could derive from the 
system used by the Italian Company Register to collect 
information that might alter the perception of the eco-
nomic conditions and legal status of Italian companies4.
2.1. Data and description. In this survey we consider 
a panel data for the years 2004-2006 of all unlisted 
Italian joint stock operating companies, enrolled in 
“Register of Companies”5, with their headquarter lo-
cated in the north of Italy6 that during this period of 
time have adopted one of the three possible CGSs 
defined above7. All data are obtained from the Stock 
View Infocamere Archive8. The data include also 
companies in transition. We have two samples charac-
terized by different CGSs: the traditional one and the 
sub-sample with one of the two alternative CGSs. The 
sample of companies with a traditional CGS comes 
from a dataset composed by Bellavite Pellegrini 
(2006) and is composed by companies with head-
quarters located in northern Italy9. This sample was 
obtained from the Chamber of Commerce in Milan, 
a legal entity which registers all companies located 
in this province. The sample includes 371 unlisted 
joint stock companies as the definition above under-
lined10. Concerning the sample of companies adopt-
ing an alternative CGS (one- or two-tier model), the 
last one does consider all the Italian companies lo-
cated in Northern Italy adopting an alternative CGS. 
This sample includes 177 unlisted joint stock compa-
nies11. It’s important to remark that these two samples 
are homogeneous because all of the companies ana-
lyzed in both samples have willingly decided to 
commit audit control to an external auditor. Then, our 
sample consists of 548 unlisted Italian joint stock 
companies adopting traditional or alternative CGSs 
two years after the introduction of the Reform. 
The number of the joint stock companies adopting 
traditional or alternative CGSs of our sample is pre-
sented in Table 1. 
                                                     
4 Because, for example, by-laws frequently grant powers not used by the 
board of directors during its terms of office. 
5 As reported by Chamber of Commerce (UnionCamere) classification, 
the definition of joint stock operating companies, enrolled in “Register 
of Companies” includes going concern firms, outage firms, pending 
firms, liquidated firms and firms in bankruptcy. 
6 As “North of Italy” we consider all provinces located in the following 
Regions: Liguria, Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardia, Trentino Alto 
Adige, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Veneto and Emilia Romagna. 
7 Traditional or alternative CGSs (one- and/or two-tier models). 
8 This database, built by Infocamere (Chamber of Commerce), contains 
all financial statements and official documents of all Italian companies, 
recorded by region and province. 
9 All located in Milan. 
10 See footnote 4 on the same page.  
11 Our sample of analysis (focused on “northern Italy”) is composed by 177 
companies, which represent 57.3% of the total amount of all unlisted Italian 
joint stock companies who decided to adopt an alternative corporate govern-
ance system at the end of 2006 (for a total amount of 309 companies, respec-
tively 193 unlisted joint stock companies who adopted a one-tier model and 
116 who decided to adopt a two-tier one). 
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Table 1. Number of unlisted Italian joint stock com-
panies adopting traditional or alternative CGSs. 
PANEL 2004-2006 – SAMPLE 
Description  Frequency 
Companies with Traditional corporate 
governance system 
371
Companies with an Alternative corporate 
governance system
177
TOTAL SAMPLE 548 
Source: Our elaborations from data of the “Stock View” Archive.
As reported in Table 1, the total sample is com-
posed by 548 firms: 67.7% of companies adopted 
a traditional CGS, characterized by one board and 
an outside Audit Committee, and 32.3% of them 
implemented alternative ones.  
Considering the 177 firms adopting an alternative 
CGS we suggest the following classification 
where Table 2 shows the distribution of firms 
with an alternative CGS.  
Table 2. Joint stock companies adopting an alternative CGS (one- and two-tier models) 
Description  Frequency % 
Joint stock companies with  
One-tier model of corporate governance system  
(one-tier board with an inside Audit Committee)  
100 56.5% 
Joint stock companies with 
Two- tier model of corporate governance system 
(Two board) 
77 43.5% 
Total 177 100% 
Source: Our elaborations from data of the “Stock View” Archive. 
Firstly, we considered all the unlisted joint stock 
companies with legal headquarter in Northern 
Italy that have decided to adopt a one-tier (board) 
model of CGS. This sample consists of 100 firms 
(about the 0.16% of the whole sample of unlisted 
joint stock operating companies enrolled in “Reg-
ister of Companies”, with legal headquarter in 
Italy at the same time). Then, we considered all 
unlisted joint stock companies with legal head-
quarter in Northern Italy which had decided to 
adopt a two-tier (board) model of CGS. The sam-
ple is composed of 77 firms (about the 0.13% of 
the whole sample of unlisted joint stock operating 
companies enrolled in “Register of Companies”, 
with legal office in Italy at the same time). 
We underline some market preferences for adopt-
ing one tier model (about 56.5%) in comparison 
to a two-tier one (about 43.5%); however, our 
sample of joint stock companies adopting an al-
ternative CGS – 177 in total  represents just 0.3 
percent of the total number of joint stock firms in 
Italy1.
The data indicates that the strategy followed by 
Italian authorities was not particularly successful 
in attracting national and foreign firms to the new 
models (Bellavite Pellegrini, 2009). Some issues 
affecting firms in deciding to adopt one of these 
three different models are worth noticing: firstly, 
                                                     
1 Over the total amount of 60.631 unlisted Italian joint stock operat-
ing companies enrolled in the “Register of Companies”, at the end 
of 2006. This is valid for observations defined above as well. We 
notice geographical distribution of the total number of 309 unlisted 
joint stock companies in Italy who adopted an alternative CGS 
(about 0.5% of all joint stock firms in Italy): most of them are 
located in Northern Italy (177 over 309, about 57.3%).   
it is difficult to anticipate the real success of these 
different systems in the future; secondly, someone 
has compared this “problem of choice” to a pris-
oner’s dilemma (Ghezzi and Malberti, 20082);
finally, other issues affect firm choice, in particu-
lar the presence of a still largely incomplete regu-
lation for the alternative models. 
2.2. Geographic location and economic activity 
(sectoral distribution). We notice that all the 
joint stock companies adopting a traditional CGS 
are located in Milan, while those joint stock com-
panies adopting an alternative CGS show a 
slightly different geographic distribution, with a 
strong presence in Milan. Table 3 shows the dis-
tribution. 
                                                     
2 “… The decision to adopt an alternative system might be a risky 
one, because it is difficult to weight ex-ante the costs and the benefits 
of a model. Hence, it would be preferable to wait for other corpora-
tions to adopt alternative systems to see if and how these systems 
work in practice”. 
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Table 3. Geographic distribution of joint stock operating companies with alternative or traditional CGSs1
Alternative corporate governance systems 
One-tier model Two-tier model 
Traditional corpo-
rate governance 
system 
Whole sample 
Geographical distribution 
Number Number   
Northern Italy:     
- with their headquarter in Milan: 42 (42%) 35 (45.5%) 371 (100%) 448 (81.8%) 
- the others2: 58 (58%) 42 (54.5%) - 100 (18.2%) 
Total 100 (100%) 77 (100%) 371 (100%) 548 (100%) 
Source: Our elaborations from data of the “Stock View” Archive.
We observe that joint stock companies adopting 
alternative CGSs are quite uniformly shared by 
Milan and “others” with an average of 44% of 
companies with an alternative CGS located in 
Milan and a percentage (on average) of 56% of 
companies with the headquarters located in other 
places in Northern Italy. Instead, considering the 
whole sample (548 firms) we observe a great 
prevalence of companies located in Milan (about 
82%). This fact leads us to consider this Milan 
sub-sample as key3.
With regard to economic activity, it is possible to 
draw some general conclusions. Consider the 
whole sample of 548 unlisted Italian firms, the 
sectoral distribution is given in Table 4. 
Table 4. Economic activity classification  whole sample joint stock companies adopting alternative or 
traditional CGSs123
Alternative corporate governance systems 
Traditional corpo-
rate governance 
system 
Whole sample 
Economic activity 
One-tier model 
North4 Milan5
Two-tier model 
North6 Milan7
Financial services and brokerage 8 (8%) 5 (11.9%) 8 (10.4%) 6 (17.1%) 43 (11.6%) 59 (10.8%)
Consultancy (business assistance) 6 (6%) 6 (14.2%) 10 (13%) 5 (14.3%) 58 (15.6%) 74 (13.5%)
Holdings 3 (3%) 1 (2.4%) 2 (2.6%) 1 (2.8%) 25 (6.8%) 30 (5.5%) 
Real estate 11 (11%) 6 (14.2%) 17 (22%) 10 (28.7%) 26 (7%) 54 (9.9%) 
Building industry 1 (1%) - 3 (3.9%) - 1 (0.3%) 5 (0.9%) 
Distribution and trade/business 4 (4%) 1 (2.4%) 5 (6.5%) 2 (5.8%) 33 (8.9%) 42 (7.7%) 
Textile/fashion 6 (6%) 2 (4.8%) 2 (2.6%) - 14 (3.8%) 22 (4%) 
Foodstuffs 5 (5%) - 3 (3.9%) 1 (2.8%) 13 (3.5%) 21 (3.9%) 
Manufacturing 28 (28%) 10 (23.8%) 13 (16.9%) 4 (11.5%) 51 (13.7%) 92 (16.8%)
Information technology 5 (5%) 5 (11.9%) 1 (1.3%) 1 (2.8%) 10 (2.7%) 16 (2.9%) 
Utilities 5 (5%) - 1 (1.3%) - 29 (7.8%) 35 (6.4%) 
Metallurgic and mining industry 10 (10%) 2 (4.8%) 5 (6.5%) 1 (2.8%) 9 (2.5%) 24 (4.4%) 
Pharmaceutical 3 (3%) 1 (2.4%) - - 13 (3.5%) 16 (2.9%) 
Tourist industry 3 (3%) 1 (2.4%) 3 (3.9%) 1 (2.8%) 6 (1.6%) 12 (2.2%) 
Publishing trade 1 (1%) 1 (2.4%) - - 19 (5.1%) 20 (3.6%) 
Others  1 (1%) 1 (2.4%) 1 (1.3%) - 18 (4.8%) 20 (3.6%) 
Outage firms - - 1 (1.3%) 1 (2.8%) 2 (0.5%) 3 (0.5%) 
N.a. - - 2 (2.6%) 2 (5.8%) 1 (0.3%) 3 (0.5%) 
Total 100 42 77 35 371 (100%) 548 
Source: Our elaborations from data of the “Stock View” Archive (Infocamere). 
                                                     
1 The percentages over the total sample or sub-sample are in parentheses. 
2 I.e. other provinces in Northern Italy. 
3 We consider here, as well as in Sections 3-4, the companies located in Milan (named “Milan sub-sample”) in models 1 and 2, that are showed in Table 8. 
4 The values classified in “North” include the value registered for “Milan” too. 
5 The values classified in “Milan” are a subset of the Northern sample.  
6 See footnote 4 on the same page. 
7 See footnote 5 on the same page. 
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Considering the full sample, we underline the 
prominence of manufacturing companies (16.8%), a 
remarkable presence of consultancy (13.5%), and 
financial services and brokerage activities (10.8%).  
Even if the alternative models of corporate govern-
ance are not yet particularly successful, it is possible 
to recognize some characteristics of the legal enti-
ties that have decided to adopt one of the alternative 
systems. According to Bellavite Pellegrini (2009), a 
large percentage of the legal entities that have 
adopted a one-tier or a two-tier model is involved in 
manufacturing activity. This is not surprising be-
cause of the great number of Italian firms in this 
sector.
Focusing our attention on companies with alternative 
CGSs, we observe that manufacturing and real estate 
firms represent the most prevalent category of compa-
nies adopting, respectively, a one-tier (board) model 
(28%) and a two-tier (board) model (22%). Financial 
services and brokerage, business consultancy, and 
metallurgic and mining industries do show a clear 
interest in adopting alternative CGSs as well.  
Considering only companies with a traditional CGS, 
we also remark some light differences with respect 
to the evidence showed by alternative systems: a 
considerable role is palyed by consultancy, financial 
service and brokerage sector, and holdings. 
2.3. Descriptive statistics: economic indices, in-
come and financial size, ownership structure 
data – Sample of statistical model. To gain sample 
reliability and data homogeneity, in the statistical 
analysis we consider the 371 firms with the tradi-
tional CGS1 and the 177 firms characterized by an 
alternative CGS, all located in Northern Italy2. The 
whole sample consists of 548 firms.
Table 5 presents some helpful accounting indices to 
point up differences between the samples considered. 
We also care about the differentiation in economic 
and financial size for the sub-sample “Milan”.  
Table 5. Descriptive statistics. Accounting indices. Sample of statistical model and econometric analysis (in 
Euro) (NORTH, Milan in parentheses) 12
Balance sheet items 
Traditional corporate 
governance system 
One-tier model of 
corporate govern-
ance system 
Two-tier model of 
corporate governance 
system 
Alternative corporate 
governance systems 
(aggregate data) 
Total sample 
Mean
136,702,278 
(-)
26,443,997 
(27,903,678) 
18,520,022 
(15,531,021)
23,022,281 
(22,368,542) 
100,058,176 
(117,219,399) 
Total sales 
Median
23,918,122 
(-)
7,826,215 
(6,183,889) 
2,342,663 
(1,650,542) 
6,330,880 
(4,357,824) 
14,439,943 
(16,863,172) 
Mean
4,353,524 
(-)
1,084,936 
(426,778) 
824,581 
(1,723,964) 
972,510 
(1,007,098) 
3,263,673 
(3,783,281) 
Net profit 
Median
598,127 
(-)
60,904 
(59,855) 
5,899 
(30,885) 
31,489 
(54,152) 
211,163 
(475,620) 
Mean
58,816,791 
(-)
9,622,959 
(9,859,659) 
22,433,193 
(36,586,587) 
15,154,651 
(21,86,442) 
44,742,548 
(52,511,798) 
Net worth 
Median
12,521,341 
(-)
2,992,345 
(1,892,152) 
2,398,456 
(2,482,659) 
2,836,313 
(2,360,460) 
7,114,523 
(9,065,331) 
Mean
495,211,759 
(-)
28,778,556 
(33,302,041) 
73,533,908 
(123,348,255) 
48,104,730 
(73,585,873) 
351,089,347 
(423,365,196) 
Total assets 
Median
45,643,223 
(-)
11,117,962 
(9,750,610) 
10,832,506 
(11,300,998) 
11,056,476 
(10,305,641) 
26,369,765 
(33,808,041) 
Mean
188,911,853 
(-)
7,745,433 
(10,346,961) 
8,100,373 
(7,770,206) 
7,897,550 
(9,194,202) 
130,787,993 
(158,287,320) 
Long-term liabilities 
Median
5,027,121 
(-)
1,776,562 
(1,075,149) 
1,957,784 
(1,330,270) 
1,864,100 
(1,271,459) 
3,034,846 
(3,465,704) 
Mean
313
(-)
66
(65)
53
(33)
60
(51)
230
(268)
N. of total employees 
Median
53
(-)
35
(21)
21
(13)
27
(19)
41
(43)
Source: Elaborations from data of the “Stock View” Archive (Infocamere), financial statement and stock ledger. * (mean and median for the 
subsample that includes just firms located in Milan  named “Milan only” – are given in parentheses). ** (-) stands for “the same value”. 
                                                     
1 All located in Milan. 
2 The majority of all firms with alternative CGS around Italy (about 57%).
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As we can see in Table 5, and considering the median 
(instead of the mean) in order not to overstate the 
size, we highlight the strong relevance of economic 
and financial size related to different CGSs. We no-
tice some differences between companies with tradi-
tional and alternative CGSs. The empirical evidence 
shows that both the one-tier and two-tier models are 
mainly used by small and medium firms; in particu-
lar, their dimension is generally smaller than for firms 
with traditional CGS; firm size is slightly bigger for 
firms with a one-tier board compared to those with 
two-tier board.  
The descriptive statistics defined above indicate that 
companies characterized by a traditional CGS show 
greater size, in terms of median, for total sales, num-
ber of total employees, total assets and net assets in 
comparison with alternative ones (Bellavite Pelle-
grini, 2006a, 2008 and 2009)1. These evidences con-
firm the idea that companies adopting an alternative 
CGS are likely to be smaller (considering the value(s) 
explained in Table 5) compared to firms with a tradi-
tional one. Comments for the sample “Northern It-
aly” (548 firms), are even more valid for the sub-
sample named “Milan only” (in parentheses). 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics. Accounting indices, financial and ownership structure data. Sample of statis-
tical model and econometric analysis (NORTH, Milan in parentheses) 
Accounting indexes, 
financial and ownership 
structure data 
Traditional corporate 
governance system 
One-tier model of 
corporate governance 
system 
Two-tier model of 
corporate governance 
system 
Alternative corporate 
governance systems 
Total 
Total sample 
Mean
-0.09 
(-)
-0.03 
(-0.01)
-0.66 
(-1.39)
-0.3
(-0.63)
-0.16 
(-0.18)
Return on equity
2
Median
0.05 
(-)
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
Mean
2.71 
(-)
1.76 
(1.80) 
1.64 
(1.86) 
1.71 
(1.83) 
2.38 
(2.56) 
Leverage
3
Median
0.28 
(-)
0.58 
(0.51) 
0.46 
(0.31) 
0.49 
(0.42) 
0.42 
(0.31)
Mean
4.15 
(-)
9.42 
(4.17)
11.25 
(5.91) 
10.21 
(4.96) 
6.10 
(4.29) 
N. of total shareholders 
Median
2.00 
(-)
3.00 
(2.00) 
3.5 
(3.00) 
3.00 
(2.00) 
2.00 
(2.00) 
Mean
78% 
(-)
69% 
(69%) 
61% 
(73%) 
65% 
(71%) 
74% 
(77%) Majority shareholder’ 
ownership (%)  
Median
97% 
(-)
76% 
(75%) 
50% 
(85%) 
65% 
(80%) 
87% 
(94%) 
Source: Elaborations from data of the “Stock View” Archive (Infocamere), financial statement and stock ledger. * (mean and median for the 
subsample that includes just firms located in Milan, named “ Milan only” are in parentheses). ** (-) stands for “the same value”. 
Table 6 shows indexes related to ownership struc-
ture, ROE, and leverage ratio. We observe a 
higher ROE (in median terms) in firms with tradi-
tional CGS; these companies show also a lower 
leverage ratio compared to alternative CGSs 
firms. All these models of governance (with a 
preference for the traditional one) are then suit-
able for tightly held corporations with some pecu-
liarities for the third one.123
We notice a slightly more fragmented ownership 
structure for companies with alternative CGSs (65 
percent is owned by the first shareholder, while for 
the sub-sample “Milan only” 80 percent is owned 
by the first shareholder), while firms with a tradi-
tional CGS show a more concentrated ownership 
                                                     
1 Companies with a one-tier board corporate governance system show a 
bigger size compared to two-tier board ones. 
2 ROE (Return on Equity) is defined by the ratio between net profit and 
net worth. 
3 Leverage is defined by the ratio between total long-term liabilities and 
net assets (financial statement data). 
structure with a percentage of 97% owned by the 
first shareholder. 
Referring to the traditional model, the evidence 
seems to support the idea that firms characterized 
by a concentrated ownership structure are more 
reluctant in changing CGS and prefer to maintain a 
traditional one. This might be due to the fact that 
the costs associated with the adoption of an alter-
native CGS may outweigh the benefits of a tailored 
organizational structure. We do not underestimate 
issues related to the adoption of these alternative 
systems  like indirect associated costs4 that, 
particularly for tightly controlled firms, may un-
dermine their appeal. Table 7 shows the legal 
status of shareholders in our sample.  
                                                     
4 First of all, we need to consider the problem related to the nature of 
collective structure of their managing board, then some indirect costs 
associated to the limited powers of the shareholders’ meeting that 
characterize the two-tier model. 
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Table 7. Descriptive statistics. Ownership structure data: shareholders by type. Sample of statistical model 
and econometric analysis  
Source: Elaborations from data of the “Stock View” Archive, financial statement and stock ledger. * (mean and median values for 
the subsample that includes just firms located in Milan, named “Milan only”, are in parentheses).
Firms with a traditional CGS are likely to be owned 
mostly by legal entities (with a percentage of 79.5). 
Similarly, two-tier companies show a weak prevalence 
of legal entities among the shareholders. On the other 
hand, companies with a one-tier CGS show a pre-
dominance of individuals among the shareholders 
(with a percentage about 54). Considering the defined 
variable “control and coordination”, we remark a con-
siderable difference between the two sub-samples 
analyzed. The sample of companies that adopted a 
traditional CGS is characterized by a relevant presence 
of firms under control and coordination (61%), while 
firms with alternative systems are in prevalence not 
under control and coordination of another one (with a 
percentage of 60%).1
We notice the presence of 137 missing values related 
to variable “control and coordination” for companies 
with a traditional CGS. Although this lack of data 
could be viewed as a problem, we checked that these 
missing values are randomly distributed across the 
sample. Therefore, data might be considered as ade-
quately revealing about informational efficiency and 
transparency of the balance sheets and related reports. 
3. Statistical methodology 
In order to analyze the probability of adopting an al-
ternative CGS, we use a Probit model developed as a 
generalization of the linear regression model in the 
presence of categorical outcome responses. In such 
cases the linear approximation is not realistic, because 
the dependent variable assumes only a limited number 
of values. Hence, the model is specified as follows: 
                                                     
1 We consider “N.a.” (not available, then, missing values) the variable 
of companies that we were not able to found for after balance sheets 
analysis and notes related.   
iiiy x
'*
,      (1) 
with:
00
01
*
*
i
i
i
yif
yif
y ,       (2) 
where iy  is the outcome variable, which assumes 
conventionally value 1 if a firm adopts an alternative 
corporate governance system and 0 otherwise; 
*
iy  is a 
continuous non-observable variable, measuring the 
“attitude” of each firm included in the sample to adopt 
a one-tier board with an inside audit committee or a 
two-tier board instead of a traditional corporate gov-
ernance system. It is assumed that only the sign of 
*
iy
is observed; it means that if 0*iy  the i-th firm 
adopts an alternative system. If 0*iy , the i-th firm 
prefers a traditional one. 
'
ix  is the vector of covariates that are supposed to be 
related to the choice of the corporate governance sys-
tem for each firm. The list of the independent variables 
includes both accounting indices (the ratio of sales to 
assets and the ratio of net worth to assets), and corpo-
rate governance variables as the percentage of the 
ownership of the first shareholder (who owns most of 
the stocks) and a categorical variable that indicates 
whether a firm is under control and coordination. Fi-
nally, we considered a last variable indicating the pro-
portion of individual shareholders. In the same way, 
is the vector of parameters that measure the impact of 
any explanatory variable on the latent variable 
*
iy : if 
j  is positive, firms with a higher value of the relative 
Ownership  
Structure data 
Traditional corporate 
governance system (%) 
One-tier model of corporate 
governance system (%) 
Two-tier model of corporate 
governance system (%) 
Total sample 
(%) 
Shareholders by type 
(absolute values)
North
(all located in Milan)
North Milan North Milan North Milan
Individual  
(mean)
(median)
(20.5%) 
(0%)
(54.7%) 
(66.7%)
(54%) 
(66.7%)
(47.2%) 
(52.1%)
(38.9%) 
(16.7%)
(30.6%) 
(0%)
(25.1%) 
(0%)
Legal entity 
(mean)
(median)
(79.5%) 
(100%)
(45.3%) 
(33.3%) 
(46%) 
(33.3%)
(52.8%) 
(47.9%) 
(61.1%) 
(83.3%)
(69.4%) 
(100%) 
(74.9%) 
(100%) 
How many firms are under 
“Control and coordination”?
   
Yes 225 47 25 10 5 282 255 
No 9 52 17 66 29 127 55 
N.a..1 137 1 - 1 1 139 138 
Total 371 100 42 77 35 548 448
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explanatory variable are more likely to implement an 
alternative system; on the other hand, if 0j , a 
higher value of the explanatory variable is related to a 
lower probability of observing a positive outcome. 
Finally, i  is a disturbance process that is drawn from 
a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance 1; a 
reason for the presence of a disturbance term is that the 
relationship between the latent and the explanatory 
variable is not exact and depends on errors, omitted 
variables and unobservable factors. 
4. Empirical results 
This section illustrates the results of the empirical 
analysis. Firstly, we consider a Probit model that com-
pares traditional vs. alternative systems. In the output 
tables parameter estimates are reported with standard 
errors in parentheses. 
Table 8. Results of probit estimation (alternative vs. 
traditional system)  
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Ratio of sales to assets: SAL/AST
.379*** 
(.123) 
.451*** 
(.160) 
Ratio of net worth to  
assets: NWORTH/AST
.862*** 
(.305) 
1.240*** 
(.445) 
SAL/AST NWORTH/AST
-1.331*** 
(.400) 
-1.167** 
(.516) 
Majority shareholder ownership  
 .707 
(.159) 
Control and coordination 
 -1.975*** 
(.306) 
Individual shareholders
 1.158*** 
(.358) 
Constant 
-1.282*** 
(171)
-.579 
(.555) 
Number of observations 446 304 
Pseudo R^2 .04 .39 
LR Test 15.78*** 134.37*** 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Source: Elaborations from data of the “Stock View” Archive (Info-
camere), financial statement and stock ledger  Stata analysis. *** 
statistically significant at 1% level. ** statistically significant at 5% 
level. * marginally significant (statistically significant at 10% level). 
Table 8 presents two different models for a sub-sample 
that includes companies located in Milan among firms 
using an alternative or a traditional system. In each 
model the outcome variable is the type of corporate 
governance system implemented by the firms included 
in the sample, while the explanatory variables change 
over the two models tested.  
Model 1 includes only accounting and financial indi-
ces reported in the previous section. In addition, we 
included an interaction variable formed by the product 
of the ratio of sales to assets and the ratio of net worth 
to assets. Interaction effects are used when movements 
in the variables we have multiplied are related to the 
dependent variable. This procedure changes the inter-
pretation of the estimates for variables that are interact-
ing: for example, the effect of the variation for the 
variable SAL/AST on the propensity to observe an 
alternative system will change by 
NWORTH/AST31  units, where 1  is the 
coefficient associated to the SAL/AST and 3  is the 
coefficient of the interaction term1. Since the sign of 
the term NWORTH/AST31  is negative when 
NWORTH/AST is high, model 1 offers evidence that 
firms with a greater ratio of sales to assets prefer a 
traditional system; similarly, the correlation between 
the ratio of net worth to assets and the probability of 
observing an alternative system is negative and signifi-
cant when SAL/AST is high. SAL/AST represents a 
respectable measure of firm performances (Bhagat and 
Black, 2001). Since SAL/AST does not consider the 
debt position of a corporation, we have added another 
performance variable NWORTH/AST, which is an 
important determinant of the value of a company, con-
sidering it is composed primarily of all the resources 
invested since its inception. Empirical evidence shows 
that firms performing better in terms of both SAL/AST 
and NWORTH/AST prefer a traditional corporate gov-
ernance system. 
Moreover, the results give broadly support for a rela-
tionship between firm size and the decision in favor of 
a traditional system, although the small value of 
2R
suggests a weak relationship. 
Model 2 considers variables related to ownership 
structure and type of governance for each firm. We 
include three explanatory variables, capturing some 
aspects of the ownership structure and of the type of 
the governance: the majority shareholder ownership, 
the proportion of individual shareholders, and the vari-
able related to being under control and coordination. 
The last regression detects a strong and highly signifi-
cant relationship between the “control and coordina-
tion” variable2 and the probability of observing a tradi-
tional system: firms under control and coordination 
seem to be more likely to maintain or adopt a tradi-
                                                     
1 A simple proof of the previous statement may be summarized in the 
following way: considering a regression with a dependent variable y
(the propensity to observe an alternative system) and two covariates 
( SAL/AST  and NWORTH/AST ) that are interacting: 
.
321
NWORTH/AST
SAL/ASTNWORTH/ASTSAL/ASTy
The effect of SAL/AST  on the dependent variable could be obtained 
through a simple algebraic transformation: 
.)( 231 NWORTH/ASTSAL/ASTNWORTH/ASTy
Hence, the effect of SAL/AST  on y  is the whole expression 
NWORTH/AST31 .
2 In spite of the high number of missing values concerning the variable 
control and coordination, further summary statistics show that the 
analysis is not biased (we are in presence of random missing values).  
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tional corporate governance system than to adopt an 
alternative one. 
Conversely, companies with a greater number of 
shareholders in terms of individuals are more likely 
to choose an alternative corporate governance sys-
tem, whereas the majority shareholder ownership 
does not have any significant impact on the choice 
of a CGS.  
Comparing the models in Table 8, we note that ac-
counting variables maintain their significance when 
governance covariates are introduced. SAL/AST vari-
able and NWORTH/AST variable remain relevant, even 
if their contribution to the rise of 
2R  is low. Indeed, the 
governance and ownership variables improve the ex-
planatory power of the model that was modest at first. 
A critical issue in Table 8 deals with the specification 
of the model that does not allow to distinguish be-
tween a one-tier and a two-tier system; indeed results 
related to the alternative systems could hide differ-
ences between the two CGSs. In order to overcome 
this problem, we implement a second probit model that 
permits us to discern one- and two-tier CGS and study 
the determinants of the choice among them. 
Because of the small number of observations consider-
ing only firms in Milan, we decided to extend the 
analysis to all the corporations that adopt an alternative 
system located in Northern Italy. 
This approach was not applicable in the last regression 
because the traditional companies in the sub-sample 
were located only in Milan. 
Table 9. Results of probit estimation (two-tier vs. one-
tier system) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
Ratio of sales to assets SAL/AST
.080 
(.186) 
.066 
(.205) 
Ratio of net worth to  
Assets NWORTH/AST
.277 
(.448) 
.207 
(.512) 
SAL/AST NWORTH/AST
-1.816*** 
(.629) 
-1.141* 
(.655) 
Majority shareholder 
ownership
 .058 
(.480) 
Control and coordination 
 -1.961*** 
(.379) 
Individual shareholders
 -1.562*** 
(.385) 
Constant 
 1.333** 
(.530) 
Number of observations 176 174 
Pseudo R^2 .07 .24 
LR Test  17.22*** 57.47*** 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Source: Elaborations from data of the “Stock View” Archive (Info-
camere), financial statement and stock ledger  Stata analysis. *** 
statistically significant at 1% level. ** statistically significant at 5% 
level. * marginally significant (statistically significant at 10% level). 
As we can see in Table 9, we focus on a sub-sample 
composed only of alternative system companies, 
investigating the impact of the same set of explana-
tory variables discussed in the previous table. 
Results concerning the main effects of accounting 
variables do not appear statistically significant in 
Model 1, even if the interaction term is significant at 
the 1% level showing that there is a correlation be-
tween the choice of the “one-tier” instead of a “two-
tier” system related to higher values of the perform-
ance indices SAL/AST and NWORTH/AST. 
As in Table 8, Model 2 appears more informative: 
the explanatory power of the model increases 
greatly when we include variables about the owner-
ship structure and the governance of the corpora-
tions; in such cases the only highly significant vari-
ables are “control and coordination” and the propor-
tion of individual shareholders, that are negatively 
connected to a two-tier system; in other words, cor-
porations under control and coordination and char-
acterized by a greater proportion of individual 
shareholders are less likely to adopt a two-tier sys-
tem, preferring instead a one-tier system. 
Regressions in Tables 8 and 9 present similar aspects 
when we focus on ownership structure and on corpo-
rate governance covariates: the variable with the 
strongest effect is the feasible companies condition to 
be under control and coordination but also the variable 
related to the percentage of individual shareholders has 
an impact on the outcome variable. Conversely, ac-
counting variables show a weaker influence in discern-
ing between the two alternative systems and seem to 
be relevant merely to explain an opposition between 
alternative and traditional system when the model is 
completely specified. 
Conclusions
The aim of this study is about the identification of the 
determinants of the adoption of alternative corporate 
governance systems in Italy. We took into considera-
tion 548 Italian unlisted joint stock companies1 adopt-
ing different corporate governance systems (one-tier 
and two-tier models and traditional ones). The survey 
supplies descriptive statistics of the main corporate 
features, in terms of balance sheet items, financial and 
ownership structures data and the nature of sharehold-
ers. The empirical analysis was divided in two parts. In 
the first one, we analyzed the determinants of the 
choice of an alternative system instead of a traditional 
one, meanwhile in the second section we compared the 
one-tier with the two-tier system within the whole 
sample (defined as “North”) of the firms adopting 
                                                     
1 Representing about 0.9% of total unlisted Italian joint stock companies 
at the end of 2006. 
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alternative systems. In both cases we used a general-
ized regression model, targeted to the identification of 
meaningful statistical explanatory variables. Regarding 
the first model we found empirical evidence that the 
ratio of Sales to Assets and the ratio of Net Worth to 
Assets are negatively correlated with the choice of an 
alternative system (when the size of the indices is rea-
sonably great), showing that corporations with better 
performances in terms of sales and capital structure 
maintain a traditional system; similarly, corporations 
that are under control and coordination prefer a tradi-
tional system. Conversely, firms registering a high 
proportion of individual shareholders in their owner-
ship do adopt alternative systems. These first results do 
not explain whether companies adopt a one or a two-
tier system. Therefore, we proceeded to leave out of 
consideration the sample of the traditional ones and 
focused our attention on the sample of the alternative 
systems, splitting between one-tier and two-tier mod-
els. Companies under control and coordination action 
are more likely to implement a one-tier system, such as 
firms with a higher proportion of individual sharehold-
ers. Other variables do not apparently contribute sig-
nificantly to the determinants of the choice of one- 
versus two-tier alternative model.  
Taking into account the fact that the percentage of 
firms adopting alternative governance systems is still 
limited, this paper represents a further contribution in 
the debate, highlighting the main economic, financial 
and ownership structure data of the unlisted joint 
stock companies adopting alternative corporate gov-
ernance systems. The results show evidence that the 
strategy followed by the Italian authorities was not 
particularly  successful in attracting national and fo- 
reign firms to the new models (Bellavite Pellegrini, 
2006 and 2009; Ghezzi and Malberti, 2008). The 
reasons of these partially “unsuccessful changes in 
corporate law” might be due to the fact that many 
corporations may have decided to postpone the deci-
sion to adopt an alternative model till the end of the 
natural term of their current governance structure 
in order to avoid the possible consequences of 
early termination, such as payment of damages to 
directors removed from the boards. However, the 
alternative models are still relatively new, so it 
may be somewhat premature for firm evidence to 
emerge about the choices of CGSs chosen by Ital-
ian companies. 
This study can be extended in several directions, 
connected with the size of alternative CGSs costs 
in order to define which system is cheaper; chang-
ing CGS implies changes not only in the govern-
ance structure of a firm, but also in the costs of the 
company bodies: since the one-tier system only has 
the board of directors, it should be the cheapest sys-
tem, followed by the traditional system and the two-
tier one which is the most complex. Some explorative 
analysis, based on propensity score matching algo-
rithms, a technique used in statistical observational 
studies, confirmed that one-tier systems are on aver-
age cheaper than two-tier ones. 
The heterogeneity of the sample did not allow a 
multinomial comparison between all three models, 
in order to establish a ranking among the systems. 
Nevertheless, what emerges is that the ratio of costs 
of conduction to total assets for companies that 
adopted a two-tier system seems to be higher. 
References
1. Abbadessa, P., Portale, G.B. (2006), Il nuovo diritto delle società, Liber amicorum Gian Franco Campobasso, 1. 
2. Amisano, G. (2004), Elementi di Econometria, Mondadori Università, Milan. 
3. Baetge, J., Thiele, S. (1998), Disclosure and Auditing as Affecting Corporate Governance, Comparative Corporate 
Governance: the state of the art and emerging research, edited by Hopt, K., Kanda, H., Roe, M.J., Wymeersch, E., 
Prigge, S. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 719-741. 
4. Barca, F., Bianco, M., Cannari, L., Cesari, R., Gola, C., Manitta, G., Salvo, G., Signorini, L.F. (1994), Assetti 
proprietari e mercato delle imprese I: Proprietà, modelli di controllo e riallocazione nelle imprese industriali 
italiane, Il Mulino, Bologna. 
5. Bebchuck, L.A., Roe, M.J. (1999), A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 
Stanford Law Review, 52, pp.127-170. 
6. Becker, C., DeFond, M., Jiambalvo, M., Subramanyam, K. (1996), The Effect of Audit Quality on Earning 
Management, Contemporary Accounting Research, 15, pp. 1-24. 
7. Beidleman, C. (1973), Income smoothing: The role of management, Accounting Review, 48, pp. 653-667. 
8. Belcredi, M., Micossi, S. (2001), Il diritto societario, corporate governance e autodisciplina: il dibattito in Italia, 
Economia Italiana, 1, pp. 105-135. 
9. Bellavite Pellegrini, C. (2006a), La riforma del diritto societario: alcune prime evidenze empiriche in “La riforma 
del diritto societario: approfondimenti ed esperienze”, Osservatorio sulla Riforma del Diritto Societario della 
Camera di Commercio di Milano, Il Sole 24 Ore, Milano, pp. 25-62. 
10. Bellavite Pellegrini, C. (2006b), Corporate Governance e assemblea delle società quotate in Italia: un’indagine 
empirica, Rivista delle Società, 2-3, pp. 401-444.  
Problems and Perspectives in Management, Volume 8, Issue 3, 2010 
15
11. Bellavite Pellegrini, C. (2008), Controllo contabile e sistema dei controlli interni nelle società per azioni in Italia: 
un’indagine empirica in “Il sistema dei controlli societari: una riforma incompiuta?”, Osservatorio sulla Riforma 
del Diritto Societario della Camera di Commercio di Milano, Il Sole 24 Ore, Milano, pp. 17-80.  
12. Bellavite Pellegrini, C. (2009), Evoluzione e dinamica quantitativa delle diverse forma giuridiche di soggetti 
economici in Italia Osservatorio sulla Riforma del Diritto Societario della Camera di Commercio di Milano e del 
Sole 24 Ore, Forthcoming. 
13. Bhagat, S., Black, B. (2001), The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long Term Firm 
Performance, Journal of Corporation Law, 27, pp. 231-274. 
14. Bianchi, M., Bianco, M., Giacomelli, S., Pacces, A., Trento, S. (2005), Proprietà e controllo delle imprese in Italia, 
Il Mulino, Bologna. 
15. Cariello, V. (2005), La disciplina “per derivazione” del sistema di amministrazione e controllo dualistico (disposizioni di 
richiamo e di rinvio nel nuovo diritto delle società per azioni non quotate), Rivista delle Società, 1, pp. 36-111. 
16. Clubb, C. (2006), Accounting, in “The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Management” Blackwell Publishing, Oxford. 
17. Coase, R. (1937), “The Nature of the Firm”, Economica, 4 (16), 386, pp. 386-405. 
18. Coffee, J.C. (2001), The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediaries, Auditor Independence the Governance 
of Accounting, Columbia Law School, The Center for Law and Economic Studies, Working Paper n. 191. 
19. Coffee, J.C. (1999), The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Corporate Convergence in Corporate 
Governance and Its Implications, Northwestern University Law Review, 93, pp. 631-707. 
20. Coffee, J.C. (1989), The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, Columbia 
Law Review, 89, pp. 1618-1691. 
21. Coffee, J.C. (2002), Understanding Enron: It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid Columbia Law School, The Center 
for Law and Economic Studies, Working Paper 207. 
22. Colombo, G.E. (2004), Amministrazione e Controllo in Serenella Rossi (eds.) Il nuovo ordinamento delle società.
23. Dyck, A., Morse, A., Zingales, L. (2007), Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? Working paper. 
24. Franks, J., Mayer, C. (1998), Bank Control, Takeovers and Corporate Governance in Germany in Hopt, K., Kanda, 
H., Roe, M.J., Wymeersch, E., Prigge, S. (eds.), “Comparative Corporate Governance: the state of the art and 
emerging research”, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 641-658. 
25. Fortunato, S. (2003), I controlli nella riforma delle società, in “Le Società”, 2, pp. 303-322. 
26. Ghezzi, F., Malberti, C. (2008), Corporate Law Reforms in Europe: The Two-Tier Model and the One-Tier Model 
of Corporate Governance in the Italian Reform of Corporate Law, European Company and Financial Law Review,
5 (1), pp. 1-47. 
27. Grezzi, F. (2003), La riforma delle società di capitali. Un confronto tra i sistemi di amministrazione e controllo: 
primi appunti sulle caratteristiche dei modelli dualistico e monistico, Working Paper. 
28. Griffiths, W.E., Carter Hill, R., Judge, G.G. (1993), Learning and Practicing Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, 
NewYork. 
29. Hansmann, H., and Kraakman, R. (2004), The Basic Governance Structure in Kraakman et al. (eds.), “The 
Anatomy of Corporate Law. A Comparative and Functional Approach”, pp. 33-70. 
30. Hopt, K.J. and Leyens, P.C. (2004), Board Models in Europe – Recent Developments of Internal Corporate 
Governance Structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, European Company and Financial 
Law Review, 1 (2), pp. 135-168. 
31. Jensen, M.C. and Meckling W.H. (1976), Theory of the Firm, Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (4), pp. 305-360. 
32. Lev, B., Zarowin, P. (1999), The Boundaries of Financial Reporting and How to Extend Them, Journal of 
Accounting Research, 37 (2), pp. 353-85. 
33. Manne, H.G. (1965), Merger and the Market for Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economy, 73 (2), pp. 110-120. 
34. Monks, R.A.G., Minow, N. (2008), Corporate Governance, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester. 
35. Shleifer A., Vishny R.W. (1995), The Limits of Arbitrage, NBER Working Paper. 
36. Shleifer A., Vishny R.W. (1997), A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance, 52 (2), pp. 737-783.  
37. Shleifer A., Vishny R.W. (1997), The Limits of Arbitrage, Journal of Finance, 52 (1), pp. 35-55. 
38. Ventoruzzo, M. (2005), Experiments in Comparative Corporate Law: The Recent Italian Reform and the Dubious 
Virtues of a Market for Rules in the Absence of Effective Regulatory Competition, Texas International Law 
Journal, 40 (1), pp. 113-140. 
39. Ventoruzzo, M. (2005), Nuovo diritto societario e analisi economica del diritto, EGEA, Milan. 
40. Weigmann, R. (2004), Sistemi alternativi di amministrazione e controllo, in Giorgio Cian (eds), “Le grandi opzioni 
della riforma del diritto e del processo societario”. 
41. Watts, R., Zimmerman, J. (1986), Positive Accounting Theory Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall. 
42. Wirth, G. (2004), Corporate Law in Germany, Munich. 
43. Zingales, L. (1994), The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of Milan Stock Exchange Experience, Review of 
Financial Studies, 7 (1), pp. 125-148. 
